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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Russian privatization has been traditionally criticized for giving rise to
several defects in enterprise ownership structure. Among them, the
domination of insiders — managers and employees — and substantial
dispersion of ownership were regarded as the most important. Both in-
siders and small outside owners were often considered as lacking nec-
essary incentives or having little opportunities for implementing enter-
prise restructuring. In the 1990s, the success of the economic reform at
the micro-level was thought to be connected with the emergence of "ef-
ficient owners", who were usually identified with large external share-
holders.
The results of the post-privatization redistribution of ownership from in-
siders to outside shareholders, which was accompanied by its concen-
tration, have proved to be ambiguous. This cast doubts on the correct-
ness of the earlier prevailing suppositions about the impact of ownership
structure on enterprise efficiency, in particular, about the role of large
shareholders. The question of what pattern of ownership promoted im-
provement of enterprise performance appeared on the policy agenda.
Our paper attempts to empirically investigate how ownership structure
affects performance of companies, whose shares are traded in the stock
market. We focus on these enterprises as, by virtue of their size, they
are the major players in the Russian economy. They also deserve a
special attention due to substantial dispersion of ownership, which is
characteristic of large enterprises. These companies certainly differ from
the average enterprise in Russia with respect to industry affiliation, size,
privatization methods, and many other parameters. At the same time we
believe that by analyzing this group of firms we can reveal patterns which
are peculiar to the Russian corporate sector at large.
We investigate how ownership structure affects labor productivity, profit-
ability, and company value, which is measured as Tobin's Q. The choice
of these three indicators makes it possible to analyze various aspects of
firm activity. For example, labor productivity is a measure of technical ef-
ficiency while Tobin's Q characterizes the value of companies from the
viewpoint of small shareholders. It is not obvious that a company with
higher labor productivity has higher market value. The latter is in many
respects determined by the policy of profit distribution among share-
holders. If controlling shareholders appropriate the lion's share of its
profit using transfer pricing or similar techniques, company value will be
low regardless of production efficiency. Thus, the selected measures of
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performance characterize both technological and profit distribution as-
pects of firm activity.
Ownership structure of enterprises is described with the help of variables
indicating the share of the three largest shareholders, the share of the
three largest private shareholders, as well as by variables reflecting the
stakes of the state, state holdings, employees and managers of enter-
prises (insiders), Russian outside shareholders, and foreign investors.
Regression analysis of data, which are represented by the balanced
panel 101 × 3, is conducted using random effects model. Parameter es-
timates are obtained with the help of the OLS as well as instrumental
variables technique, which is employed to correct regression results for
endogeneity of ownership.
Our investigation proves the hypothesis that concentration of ownership
brings labor productivity improvements. This result can be explained by
better monitoring which occurs under more concentrated ownership
structures and which restricts opportunities of managers to pursue their
own objectives.
Our analysis shows that the relationship between profitability and owner-
ship concentration exhibits a U-shaped pattern, reaching the minimum
when concentration approaches 56%. We also find that ownership con-
centration negatively affects market value of companies. Thus, efficiency
improvements (higher productivity of labor) stemming from ownership
concentration do not adequately materialize in higher profitability and
market value of companies. These results testify to the conflicts arising
between large and small shareholders regarding distribution of company
profit. Large shareholders, which wield significant power in the company,
appropriate its profit, depriving small owners of their part of residual in-
come.
We also find that the controlling blocks of shares at the disposal of the
state or state holding companies prevent large private shareholders from
expropriating the small ones. Thus, in 1995 – 1997 state ownership in
Russian companies played a positive role in corporate governance.
As regards the role of various groups of owners, we find that larger own-
ership by Russian outside shareholders, who are not connected to the
state, negatively affects company value. This result indicates that this
group of owners is inclined to the extraction of private benefits of control
and expropriation of small shareholders.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ambiguous results of economic reforms in Russia in the 1990s are at-
tributed to many factors among which corporate governance problems
seem to play an important role. It was common to blame the privatization
process, which resulted in substantial dispersion of ownership as well as
in employee ownership unprecedented by any standard, for the lack of
restructuring and poor performance of Russian enterprises. The core
problem was seen in the slight involvement of atomistic shareholders in
corporate affairs, as well as in the prevalence of particular interests of
shareholders-employees which prevented or delayed enterprise restruc-
turing. Not surprisingly, redistribution of ownership from insiders to out-
side investors as well as concentration of ownership, especially in the
hands of outside owners, were typically considered as remedies for inef-
ficiencies emerging in the course of privatization. However, post-
privatization changes in the distribution of ownership, which were more
or less in line with the above-mentioned suppositions, brought uncertain
consequences for company performance. On the one hand, there are
many success stories with companies that obtained majority sharehold-
ers, especially from abroad. On the other hand, there is extensive evi-
dence, sometimes anecdotal, of the behavior of large shareholders
which is directed towards extraction of private benefits of control rather
than restructuring of production and improving economic efficiency.
Thus, the question of what type of ownership contributes to the revitali-
zation of Russian enterprises and the Russian economy at large is far
from being resolved. This paper attempts to shed some light on this is-
sue. It starts with a theoretical overview of the relationship between own-
ership and performance. Then we survey the most important results ob-
tained through empirical studies to date. The last part of the paper
describes the data and methodology, and presents the results of our
empirical investigation.
2. OWNERSHIP-PERFORMANCE
RELATIONSHIP: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
2.1. Traditional approach to corporate governance
Consequences of ownership structure for corporate efficiency and
performance have been in the focus of scientific debate over the last
70 years after A. Berle and G. Means published their famous work
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA8
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Berle and Means, 1932).
Since 1970s this issue has been usually analyzed in the context of prin-
cipal-agent relationships between shareholders and managers. In cor-
porations, the agency relationship typically, though not necessarily,
emerges as a result of diffusion of ownership, where numerous small
owners are incapable to run their firm collectively and have to transfer
their control rights to a special subject of governance, i.e., to the man-
agement team.
In terms of the agency theory, separation of ownership and control gives
rise to agency costs, which worsen performance of companies. Since
the interests of management (agents) need not and normally do not co-
incide with those of owners (principals), there is a considerable risk that
corporate resources will be used not in the pursuit of shareholder profit.
As a result, corporate shareholders are in need of reliable means of
control over managerial behavior.
There are four basic control forces bearing on the corporation that act to
bring about coincidence of managers' decisions with those that are op-
timal from shareholders' standpoint. They are the capital markets, the
legal and regulatory system, the product and factor markets, and the
internal control system (Jensen, 1997). The latter provides participation
of shareholders in governance through election and representation in the
boards of directors and serves as the most direct mechanism by which
shareholders can influence management. However, the efficacy of this
mechanism is limited under diffuse ownership structures when the im-
provement of corporate governance is a public good for small share-
holders. Due to free-riding of small owners, managers face little control
and can easily use their discretion for pursuing their own objectives.
These may include expropriation of investors' funds, building an empire,
or simply living an easy life. After Berle and Means' analysis it has been
common to state that dispersed shareholders are "powerless" in the
face of managerial opportunism.
According to this line of reasoning, concentration of ownership is a
straightforward way to mitigate agency problems between owners and
managers. The literature on corporate governance says that large own-
ers have stronger incentives and better opportunities to exercise control
over managers than small shareholders. Moreover, some scholars argue
that most corporate governance mechanisms used in the world can be
viewed as examples of concentrated ownership (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997).
To summarize, the traditional approach views the main corporate gov-
ernance problem as the opposition of self-interested managers and
weak dispersed shareholders.
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2.2. Modern perspective on corporate governance
In recent years the concept of corporate governance underwent sub-
stantial changes. They were evoked by the fact that widely held corpora-
tion, which was the main focus of the corporate governance literature, is
a rare phenomenon, except for a few countries with common law origin
(Bergloef and von Thadden, 1999). In the rest of the world, including
most European countries, relatively concentrated ownership prevails. In
companies with concentrated ownership, managers are no longer able to
act at their own discretion and are constrained to devising company
strategies that are subject to non-transparent obligations which large
blockholders impose on them. As a result, the framework of corporate
governance enlarges to embrace tangled relationships between manag-
ers, large blockholders, and minority shareholders.
This new framework introduces substantial complexity in the analysis of
ownership-performance relationship. In particular, it becomes clear that
concentrated ownership has its costs. They may arise when large share-
holders, capable to influence corporate decisions directly, maximize
value for themselves and deprive small owners of their part of residual
income. This phenomenon has received much attention in the literature
under the name of "extraction of private benefits of control" (e.g.,
Barclay and Holderness, 1989). To the extent these private benefits of
controls are pecuniary (as it is the case, e.g., with transfer pricing), cor-
porate performance deteriorates. Other negative consequences of own-
ership concentration include raised cost of capital due to lower market
liquidity or decreased diversification opportunities on the part of inves-
tors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Moreover, concentrated ownership pre-
vents additional monitoring of managers by the stock market, which is
available under diffuse ownership with high liquidity of shares (Holm-
strom and Tirole, 1993). Some recent studies point out that too high
concentration of ownership may lead to excessive monitoring of manag-
ers by shareholders which in turn can reduce manager initiative. This ini-
tiative is not necessarily considered as harmful; in fact, it can be benefi-
cial as it induces managers to make firm-specific investments (Burkart
et al., 1996). Hence, there is a trade-off between monitoring gains ob-
tainable through concentration of (outside) ownership and potential
benefits from providing managers with some discretion through more
diffuse ownership structures.
To summarize, the traditional approach, which focuses on minority
shareholders protection from managerial opportunism, is now under fire
as "too narrow". Its deficiencies are particularly obvious in applications
to developing and transition countries, where large strategic investors
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are the major players on the corporate governance scene (Bergloef and
von Thadden, 1999).
Recent literature on corporate governance also pays much attention to
the issue of shareholder identity. It stresses that the objective functions
and the costs of exercising control over managers vary substantially for
different types of owners. The implication is that it matters not only how
much equity a shareholder owns, but also who is this shareholder — a
private person, worker, manager, financial institution or non-financial
enterprise.
Among different ownership patterns managerial ownership seems to be
the most controversial as it has ambivalent effects on firm performance.
On the one hand, it is considered as a tool for alignment of managerial
interests with those of shareholders. Managerial ownership provides
managers with monetary incentives to maximize profit and thus improves
company performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand,
managerial ownership promotes entrenchment of managers which is es-
pecially costly when they have low qualification or prefer to live an easy
life (Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988). The overall impact of managerial
ownership on corporate performance depends on the relative strengths
of the incentive alignment and entrenchment effects. The conclusion is
that the optimal stake of managers cannot be derived from the existing
theories and should be determined through empirical studies.
The outcome of outside ownership depends on the degree to which out-
siders are able to monitor and control managers. It is assumed that con-
centration of outside ownership increases the likelihood that such control
will be exercised. However, the effect of ownership concentration in the
hands of outside owners on company performance is not necessarily
considered as continuous. In fact, a more realistic approach is to view
this effect as a discontinuous function depending on the distribution of
control over the firm. For example, quite different governance patterns
may exist when there is a single majority owner who controls the firm,
there are two large shareholders with confronting interests, or there is no
clear locus of control.
Some groups of outside investors may deliberately abstain from hav-
ing large ownership stakes. This is the case with many financial insti-
tutions — banks, insurance companies, investment funds, etc., which
prefer liquidity of their investments to exercising tighter control over
companies (Coffee, 1991). Industrial firms, if they are shareholders in
other companies, usually tend to take a more active position in corporate
governance.
Employee ownership. Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) point out that
from the corporate governance point of view employee ownership has
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long been considered a bad idea by Western economists. Yet several
theoretical arguments can be presented both in favor of employee own-
ership, and against it. Hansmann (1990, p. 307) argues that employees
of almost all industries are in a very good position to monitor the man-
agement of the firm for the following reasons: "the majority of their in-
come typically comes from their work relationship with the firm; they are
in daily contact with the firm operations, and knowledgeable about some
aspects of them; and they are easily organized for collective decision
making". On the other hand, collective actions, and consequently con-
trol, are hampered because employees have different objectives due to
their difference in age, part of enterprise where they are employed, and
their value to the company (Hansmann, 1990).
Monitoring problem is just one of the consequences of employee owner-
ship which affect enterprise performance. Employee ownership also has
an impact on the opportunities of firms to raise capital as well as to miti-
gate agency problems between the manager representing the owner and
the employees. Many scholars argue that employee-owned firms have
worse opportunities to raise external funds compared to outside-owned
firms. The core problem is the risk facing potential investors that the
funds will be used to maintain and pay the inputs of labor rather than the
inputs of capital. Employee ownership is also said to provide a solution to
the agency problem between manager and employee, i.e., to the classi-
cal conflict between capital and labor. However, the opponents of this
viewpoint claim that employee ownership can hardly result in increased
efforts on the part of employees, especially in large firms. Each em-
ployee is entitled to a small fraction of extra profit generated by his or
her effort; hence, there is a free-rider effect. On the other hand, even if
the incentive effects of employee ownership are indeed negligible, it may
foster mutual monitoring among employees who have a direct interest in
company performance. Thus, the theory seems not to provide us with
any definite conclusion on consequences of employee ownership for firm
efficiency and performance.
State ownership. With respect to this form of ownership there is much
more unanimity in the academic circles. State ownership has been re-
garded as inefficient, especially during the last two decades. For exam-
ple, De Alessi (1980) and De Alessi (1982) define state-owned enter-
prises as "political" firms with general public as a collective owner. A
specific characteristic of these firms is that individual citizens have no
direct claim on their residual income and are not able to transfer their
ownership rights. Ownership rights are exercised by some level in the
bureaucracy, which has vague incentives to improve firm performance.
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) consider the lack of incentives as the major
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argument against state ownership. Other explanations for inefficiency of
state ownership include the price policy (Shapiro and Willig, 1990), po-
litical intervention (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), and human capital prob-
lems (Krueger, 1990).
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.1. Developed economies
This section provides a review of empirical studies on ownership-
performance relationship which have been conducted in the West. Most
of them are based on data from the United States and to a large extent
follow Berle and Means' traditional approach.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use cross-sectional regression of accounting
rate of return on a number of variables reflecting ownership concentra-
tion (percentage of shares controlled by top five and top 20 sharehold-
ers, Herfindahl index of ownership concentration). They report no
statistically significant relationship between profitability and ownership
concentration and suggest that this finding testifies to that the existing
ownership structures have been optimized in the natural selection
process.
Prowse (1992) applied Demsetz and Lehn's model to Japanese data.
Similarly to the American case, he does not find any statistically signifi-
cant relationships between ownership concentration and firm perform-
ance in Japan.
Morck et al. (1988) examine the relationship between Tobin's Q (the ra-
tio of the market value of firm to the replacement value of its assets) and
the fraction of stock held by the members of the board of directors using
a sample of 371 U.S. firms. They find that ownership concentration is
positively related to Tobin's Q as long as the stake of directors does not
exceed five per cent, negatively between five and 25 per cent and has
some weak positive effect beyond this interval. A weaker relationship is
found when accounting rate of return is used as performance indicator.
In other words, these findings testify to the presence of two effects as-
sociated with managerial ownership: convergence of interests and en-
trenchment problem. The authors also discuss some other explanations
for the positive relationship between performance and managerial own-
ership when the latter is relatively small. They suggest that reversed cau-
sality may play a substantial role there. The argument is that managers
of high-performing firms may receive large compensation in the form of
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equity, thus it may be performance that affects managerial ownership
and not the other way around.
McConell and Servaes (1990) investigate the link between ownership
structure and the value of firm, measured by Tobin's Q. Among different
ownership categories they distinguish between the stake of insiders (di-
rectors), the stake of institutional investors, and the one of large outside
blockholders (not represented in the board of directors). They find a re-
versed U-shaped relationship between Tobin's Q and shareholdings of
insiders. Besides, they report a positive relationship between Tobin's Q
and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors.
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) find that large shareholders, who
act as an interested in monitoring group, exert positive influence on
performance of firms with low levels of specific capital (firms with low
R&D-sales ratio). In such firms, the presence of owners wielding over 15
percent of stock has a positive significant effect on price-earnings ratio.
This implies abnormal expected growth of future earnings for such com-
panies.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) analyze the interdependence among alter-
native control mechanisms, namely shareholdings of insiders, institu-
tions, and large blockholders, the use of outside directors, debt policy,
the managerial labor market, and the market of corporate control. They
report a positive effect of shareholdings of insiders on firm performance
measured by Tobin's Q. Also, they find that shareholding by blockholders
and institutions are alternative avenues for outsider activism.
Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) investigate the effect of large share-
holders on wealth of minority investors in Germany. They report that two
beneficial effects associated with the presence of large shareholders,
namely better monitoring of management and reduced incentives to ex-
ploit minority shareholders outweigh harmful effects connected to the
extraction of greater private benefits of control.
Holderness et al. (1999) study how ownership and governance
have evolved since the Great Depression. They find that managerial
ownership of publicly traded firms increased on average from 13% to
22% between 1935 and 1995. It indicates that the separation of owner-
ship and control was not complete even in the 1930s, when Berle and
Means' hypothesis was advanced. Another important finding is that prof-
itability is significantly increasing with increase of management owner-
ship in the 0 – 5% range and decreasing in the 5 – 25% range in the
1935 sample. For the 1995 sample, Tobin's Q is significantly increasing
in the 0 – 5% range.
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It should be noted that the dominant approach for tackling the issue on
ownership-performance relationship has been a regression analysis of
cross-sections of firms, in which profitability or Tobin's Q are used as
dependent variable and various characteristics of ownership structure
play the role of regressors. Yet there are other methodological ap-
proaches. For example, Wruck (1988) examines a change in firm value at
the announcement of private sale of new equity. The rationale for this
study is that private sale of equity, in contrast to public offerings of se-
curities, increases ownership concentration. She reports that ownership
concentration exerts positive impact on firm value.
To sum up, there is no complete consistency in findings that have been
obtained through empirical investigations in the West. Inconsistencies
can partly be attributed to the variations in performance measures em-
ployed in different studies. For example, no relationship between owner-
ship and performance is typically found when performance is measured
as accounting rate of return. On the contrary, some results obtained for
Tobin's Q seem to conform to the theory predicting positive effect of
ownership concentration and mixed effect of managerial ownership.
Also, several issues have virtually been left out of quantitative investiga-
tions in the West. For example, empirical analysis of investor ownership
versus worker ownership is uncommon since these ownership forms pre-
vail in different industries. In the United States worker ownership domi-
nates in the service professions, including law, management consulting,
advertising, architecture, engineering and medicine and is rare in indus-
trial firms where investor ownership prevails (Hansmann, 1990).
3.2. Transition economies
The relationship between ownership and performance in transition coun-
tries has received enormous attention due to both extensive policy impli-
cations and the possibility to gain new insights into the economic theory.
As noted by Frydman et al. (1997), a great diversity of ownership forms
on the early stages of their evolution and the distribution of these forms
regardless of their efficiency for particular types of business enable to
study the relative advantages of different ownership forms before the
less efficient of them will disappear. They also point out that underdevel-
opment or non-existence in the transition environment of many mecha-
nisms substituting for the role of owners (e.g., the market for corporate
control and bankruptcy enforcement) gives a chance to disclose the
"real" effect of ownership. This section briefly surveys recent empirical
evidence on the link between ownership and performance in transition
and developing economies.
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Xu and Wang (1997) examine ownership-performance relationship for a
sample of Chinese publicly listed companies. They document a positive
and significant correlation between ownership concentration and profit-
ability as well as the importance of large institutional shareholders in
corporate governance and inefficiency of state ownership.
Frydman et al. (1997) find a positive impact of private ownership on
revenue-generating, cost restructuring, expanding employment and on
overcoming the severe shock of "marketization" in transition economies.
They also discuss performance differences among various types of pri-
vate ownership, and several of their findings in this area run contrary to
widely held beliefs concerning the effects of managerial ownership and
the role of privatization funds and foreign investors.
Using a cross-section of 706 Czech firms over the period 1992 – 1997,
Claessens and Djankov (1999) find that more concentrated ownership is
associated with higher profitability and labor productivity. These findings
are weakly robust to the inclusion of control variables for the type of
ownership, or to the correction for the endogeneity of ownership con-
centration.
In spite of long history of ownership debates in Russia, empirical evi-
dence on actual ownership-performance relationship is not very exten-
sive. Most papers are based on relatively old data that were collected at
the end of the voucher privatization process. Besides, they rarely go far
beyond describing various ownership patterns that emerged in the
course of privatization. A typical example is EBRD Transition Report
(1995) that contains strong statements about inefficiency of insider-
dominated firms which are supported by vague empirical evidence from
the early post-privatization period in Russia and Eastern Europe.
Frydman et al. (1996) define Russian economy as "insider-dominated"
without drawing clear distinctions between managers and workers. A
study by Blasi (1996), which was prepared for the Federal Commission
for the Securities Market, leaned on interviews with general directors that
were conducted at the end of 1995. According to Blasi, Russian compa-
nies were largely owned by insiders with the largest stakes held by work-
ers. He pointed out that workers were often passive shareholders and
did not participate in corporate decision-making. Ownership by manag-
ers reached a very high level in some companies and was still increas-
ing. Outsider ownership increased since the end of voucher privatization
and seemed to level off over 1995.
A paper by Willer (1997) is among those studies which are closely re-
lated to the subject of this paper. His study is based on a sample of 140
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largest joint-stock companies and shows that large shareholders are
able to put more pressure on management. This finding could be ex-
tended to substantiate that the presence of large shareholders improves
firm performance.
Earle (1998) examines the impact of ownership structure on the per-
formance of Russian firms soon after the conclusion of voucher privati-
zation in 1994. The author uses labor productivity as measure of com-
pany performance and employs two-stage instrumental variables
estimation to correct regression results for endogeneity of ownership. He
reports a positive impact of outside ownership and ownership by manag-
ers on firm productivity.
Buck et al. (1999) use a survey data from Russia, Belarus, and the
Ukraine and find that the influence of employee (and managerial) owner-
ship seems to be fairly benign. Their findings also show that outside
ownership is associated with more active asset retrenchment strategies
in crisis situations.
Brown and Earle (2000) use an extensive panel dataset from
1993 – 1998, covering 82% of industrial employment in 1993. They find
that the best performers are municipally owned firms, which are followed
by firms with mixed (state and private) ownership, regionally and federally
owned firms, joint ventures, and 100% private firms. Among private own-
ership types, firms with greater insider stake and shares sold at voucher
auctions have performed significantly worse, while firms with holding com-
pany shares, foreign shares, and golden shares have performed better.
Kapelyushnikov (2000) sums up the results of three surveys by Russian
Economic Barometer conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1999. He reports
a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and perform-
ance: the best performing firms have moderate ownership concentration
measured by the stake of their largest shareholders. He also stresses
the importance of distinguishing between the identities of large share-
holders in order to draw credible inferences on the role of ownership
concentration. In his study, the worst performance turns out to be typical
of firms with the highest ownership concentration. The largest share-
holders in such firms are non-financial outsiders (mainly individual share-
holders affiliated with managers) or the state. The author suggests
that the principal function of non-financial outsiders is to protect a firm
(i.e., its managers) from financial outsiders.
To summarize, quite different and sometimes contradictory results have
been obtained through numerous investigations in transition countries.
Thus, the relationship between ownership and performance deserves
additional attention.
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4. AIM OF THE STUDY
The principal aim of this study is to investigate the impact of ownership
concentration on the performance of Russian non-financial privatized
enterprises that constitute the group of "blue chips" of the country's
stock market. This is to test the hypothesis once advanced by Berle and
Means that company performance to a large extent depends on the de-
gree of ownership concentration, and higher ownership concentration is
associated with better performance. The second goal is to examine the
impact of different ownership forms or different groups of owners on
corporate performance. The main hypothesis is that insider ownership
has a negative effect on firm performance while various forms of outside
ownership lead to its improvement.
The study focuses on publicly traded companies for several reasons.
First, most of these enterprises are large in size and have substantial im-
pact on the Russian economy. Second, significant dispersion of owner-
ship, which is typical of large companies, calls for a special attention.
Last but not least, by studying traded companies one faces less severe
data problems as ownership and financial information about these firms
is relatively easy to obtain.
This study offers a contribution to the debate on corporate ownership in
Russia as it employs more recent data and improved methodology in
comparison with previous studies. A bulk of existing empirical evidence
comes from data collected at the time of privatization or the early post-
privatization period. The findings from these studies can be questioned,
as it is unclear whether advantages of various ownership structures
could be realized within a short period after privatization of firms. Moreo-
ver, by dealing with data from 1993 – 1994 a researcher faces a large
incidence of residual state ownership, which makes it problematic to in-
vestigate the effect of ownership concentration, as it is traditionally per-
ceived in corporate governance studies — concentration of private own-
ership. Therefore, by using more recent post-privatization data from
1995 – 1997 we may obtain more sound conclusions regarding the im-
pact of ownership on company performance. From the pure technical
viewpoint, the study differs from many previous papers as it is based on
panel data and employs instrumental variables technique to correct re-
gression results for endogeneity of ownership.
5. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
We have data on Russian companies compiled from the blue chips data-
base of the Skate Financial Press Agency. The original database contains
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financial and ownership information for 236 firms, whose shares were
traded in the stock market in 1997 – 1998. From this list we excluded
companies belonging to the financial sector, newly created firms, as well
as firms with no established secondary market for their shares by the
end of 1995, 1996, and 1997. In addition, we excluded several firms for
which financial and ownership information in 1995 – 1997 was inaccessi-
ble1 and two companies — Gazprom and Unified Energy Systems —
which, being virtually states within the state, have a very special position
in the Russian economy. In some cases, the data from the Skate Press
were supplemented by information from the Federal Commission on
Capital Markets web-site,2 Gnosis and AK&M databases, Brunswick Bro-
kerage's Russian Equity Guide yearbook, and the Russian financial
press. The resulting database contains key financials, employment,
capitalization, and ownership data for 101 Russian companies.
Sample structure by size. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sam-
pled firms across size categories distinguished in the official Russian
statistics: medium-size enterprises (200 – 999 employees), large enter-
prises (1000 – 9999 employees), and extra-large ones (more than 10000
employees). The sample mainly covers extra-large enterprises, and the
distribution of firms across different size categories is rather stable within
the period.
Table 1. Sample distribution by size.
1994 1995 1996 1997
Medium (less than 1000
employees) 2 2 2 1
Large (from 1000 to 10000
employees) 33 33 35 37
Extra-large (more than
10000 employees) 66 66 64 63
More detailed descriptive statistics for some key financials, employ-
ment, and capitalization data for the sampled companies are shown in
Appendix 1.
Sample structure by industry. Sector affiliation of the sampled compa-
nies is reported in Table 2. Five industries, namely oil, gas & chemical,
                                               
1 Oil holdings ONAKO, Sibneft, Eastern Oil Company are examples of firms that
started to provide consolidated financial reporting in 1997 at best.
2 See http://disclosure.fcsm.ru.
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metallurgy, power utilities, telecoms, and engineering together amount to
86% of the total number of firms in the sample. Table 2 also shows the
distribution of the top 200 Russian companies with the highest market
capitalization across basic industries.3 The sample can be regarded as
reasonably representative with respect to the sector affiliation of the
largest publicly traded companies.
Table 2. Sample distribution by industry.
Sample "Expert-200"
No. of firms % No. of firms %
Oil, gas, and chemical 22 21.8 54 27.0
Metallurgy 18 17.8 14 7.0
Telecommunications 17 16.8 52 26.0
Power utilities 16 15.8 41 20.5
Engineering 14 13.9 23 11.5
Transport 6 5.9 6 3.0
Pulp and paper 3 3.0 2 1.0
Food processing 2 2.0 5 2.5
Others 3 3.0 3 1.5
Total 101 100 200 100
Regional distribution. Distribution of the sampled companies across the
major economic regions of the Russian Federation is shown in Table 3.
The lion's share of companies (74%) is located in five major regions: the
Urals, West Siberia, North-West, Central, and Volga. The table also pro-
vides information on the location of the Expert-200 companies with the
highest market capitalization in 1998. In a more detailed classification
(not reported) the sampled firms are distributed across 33 administrative
areas or "subjects of the Federation", among which the capitals as well
as Tyumen, Chelyabinsk, Samara, Sverdlovsk, and Irkutsk oblast domi-
nate.
                                               
3 The data are taken from the Expert-200 list as of September 1998.
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Table 3. Regional distribution of the sample.
Sample "Expert-200"
No. of firms % No. of firms %
North 5 4.9 7 3.5
North West 15 14.9 11 5.5
Central 12 11.9 48 24.0
Volga-Vyatka 3 3.0 17 8.5
Black-earth 3 3.0 9 4.5
Volga 12 11.9 18 9.0
North Caucasus 4 4.0 16 8.0
Urals 19 18.8 27 13.5
West Siberia 17 16.8 24 12.0
East Siberia 6 5.9 10 5.0
Far East 5 4.9 13 6.5
Total 101 100 200 100
Privatization of the sampled companies. With respect to privatization
patterns the sampled companies differ substantially from what was ob-
served in Russia at large.4 The so-called option 2 (majority ownership by
workers and managers) was chosen by 40 companies while 61 compa-
nies went through option 1 privatization (no majority ownership by insid-
ers). For the whole country the following statistics are available: of all
enterprises privatized by the end of voucher privatization 25% chose
option 1, 73% — option 2, and only 2% — option 3 (Boycko et al., 1995,
p. 98). The sample has a very high percentage of firms privatized under
option 1 since it includes many large and extra-large capital-intensive
companies in which insiders were often incapable to accumulate enough
funds to buy 51% of shares.
                                               
4 The Russian privatization program allowed three major models of privatization,
the so-called option 1, option 2, and option 3, the main difference among which
was the amount of shares offered for insiders at preferential terms.
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There is another distinct feature of the sample. After initial distribution or
sale of shares to employees, subsequent privatization of most Russian
enterprises was conducted through voucher auctions, money auctions or
investment contests. In contrast to that, a lot of the sampled companies
were privatized through the transfer of shares remaining at state disposal
to some holding company which later on could remain either state-
controlled (e.g., Svyazinvest) or fully privatized (e.g., Yukos).5 In other
words, privatization of some of the companies was conducted outside
the market, and was determined by political decisions. In most cases
holding companies became the owners of controlling blocks of shares
accumulating over 51% of voting stock. Such holding privatization was
implemented in 48 companies — about half of the sampled firms.
This way of privatization was typical of all telecommunication companies
(excluding Rostelecom, in which the government held a significant stake
during 1995 – 1997), power utilities (excluding Irkutskenergo), and many
oil extraction companies. It should be pointed out that a large number of
companies privatized through this method are not a specific characteris-
tic of the sample; rather, it is peculiar to the majority of Russian firms
that constitute the basis of the country's stock market.
Thus, with respect to holding privatization the sample seems to be rep-
resentative if the population is associated with the "blue chips" group
and unrepresentative for the population of all Russian privatized enter-
prises. It should also be emphasized that out of the mentioned 48 com-
panies that underwent holding privatization, 36 were partly owned by
some state-controlled holding at the beginning of 1997.6 Besides, mi-
nority blocks of shares of some other companies were also transferred
to state-controlled holdings. In 1997 several state holdings had minority
ownership stakes in six companies included in the sample.
The last remark with respect to privatization of the sampled companies is
that six of them went through "loans-for-shares" scheme in 1995, when
a number of Russian banks obtained substantial blocks of their shares as
collateral for providing the government with interest-free loans. This
scheme was applied to the total of 12 Russian enterprises. Neither of the
loans was ever repaid and the banks became the owners of the shares.
                                               
5 Starting from here the transfer of controlling blocks of shares to holding compa-
nies will be referred to as to "holding privatization".
6 A holding company is defined as state-controlled if the government has a con-
trolling block of its voting stock.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA22
6. METHODOLOGY
6.1. Performance measures
The concept of enterprise performance allows many interpretations. In
applied studies it is common to associate improvements in firm perform-
ance with increased profitability, higher efficiency, and increased output
(Bevan et al., 1999).
The spectrum of alternative profitability measures includes income, re-
turn on equity, return on assets, and return on sales. These measures
are based on the income before deduction of interest (the return to both
equity and debt holders), taxable or net income (the return to equity
holders) depending on what is the focus of a specific study.
Total factor productivity, which is the best measure of enterprise effi-
ciency from the theoretical viewpoint, is not widely used due to difficul-
ties in measuring capital stock. Instead, many studies focus on efficiency
in terms of labor productivity. This indicator, however, is of short-term
nature since it is based on the implicit assumption that the level of capi-
tal remains unchanged.
As proxy for expected long-run firm performance many studies use To-
bin's Q, which is defined as the ratio of the market value of company to
the replacement value of its assets. In most cases Tobin's Q is calcu-
lated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of
debt to the book value of assets since the market value of debt and the
replacement value of assets are often unknown. The reliability of this in-
dicator clearly depends on the degree of stock market efficiency.
Moreover, as this measure is normally constructed using the book value
of assets in the denominator, distortions can be expected due to inade-
quate measurement of capital.
Measurement of enterprise performance in transition economies faces
additional difficulties. They primarily stem from high inflation rates and
changes in accounting standards. In Russia the problem of measuring
capital stock seems to be the most severe one — historical values of
fixed assets, which were based on "socialist" prices, underwent several
mandatory revaluations during transition period when current values of
assets were determined by multiplying their old book value by some co-
efficient. Moreover, possible distortions of figures reported in income
statements must be taken into account. With respect to sales these dis-
tortions can be caused, e.g., by arbitrariness of pricing when firms use
barter and other non-monetary forms of payment, which are still wide-
spread in Russia. The biggest concern is profit if measured net of taxes
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since taxes are often viewed as endogenous rather than parametric
(Schaffer, 1998).
Many studies in transition economies rely on labor productivity as the
best measure of enterprise performance (see, e.g., Earle, 1998).
Some authors have utilized Tobin's Q to analyze enterprise performance
in several transition economies with fairly well developed stock market.
Among them, there are a study of Czech firms (Claessens et al., 1996)
and an analysis of investment performance in Russian enterprises in
1995 – 1996 (Perotti and Gelfer, 1998). As pointed out by Bevan et al.
(1998, p. 8), Perotti and Gelfer's findings suggest that before the 1998
economic crisis "Tobin's Q was a reasonably robust explanatory vari-
able" in Russia.
Taking the above discussion into account it should be stressed that no
one of possible performance indicators can be given the absolute prior-
ity. On this ground it may be advantageous to employ several measures
rather than select a single one relying on subjective assumptions about
their appropriateness.
In this study we consider three measures of firm performance, namely
labor productivity, profitability, and Tobin's Q. This choice is motivated by
the assumption that these performance indicators may have different in-
terpretations as characterizing different aspects of firm's operations. For
example, labor productivity can be interpreted as a measure of enter-
prise efficiency that refers to the technological dimension of firms. Unlike
labor productivity, Tobin's Q, which is calculated on the basis of share
prices, reflects company value for small shareholders. Though there is
an obvious connection between these two performance measures (labor
productivity improvements should be reflected in higher prices of shares
and, consequently, higher Q) the latter indicator captures other signifi-
cant factors, e.g., risks of expropriation of small shareholders by large
owners. The value of a company with high labor productivity (or technical
efficiency in general) may be low if large shareholders appropriate the
lion's share of company profits using transfer pricing or similar tech-
niques.
Before constructing performance indicators we made some adjustments
to the accounting data in order to reduce the impact of inflation and to
eliminate several imperfections of the Russian accounting practices.
These procedures are described in Appendix 2.
We calculate labor productivity as the ratio of sales revenues excluding
VAT and excises (all adjusted for inflation) to year-average number of
employees. Profitability is defined as gross profit (net of interest and de-
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preciation, but gross of taxes) over book value of equity at the year-end
(all adjusted for inflation). Due to substantial discrepancies between the
market value of debt and the value of debt in the balance sheets of Rus-
sian companies, the traditional market-to-book proxy for Tobin's Q is not
used. Following Perotti and Gelfer (1998), Tobin's Q is defined as the ra-
tio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. To calculate
Tobin's Q we use unadjusted year-end values of market capitalization
and book values of equity. Descriptive statistics for the mentioned per-
formance measures are given in Appendix 3.
As it follows from Appendix 4, which presents correlations between the
selected performance indicators, the correspondence among them is far
from perfect. Labor productivity, which is often considered as the best
indicator of company performance, turns out to be positively correlated
with profitability; the link implies that more productive companies are
more profitable. The correlation, however, is rather weak. Tobin's Q is
almost unrelated to labor productivity in 1995 and 1996, but is strongly
correlated with profitability. The latter result testifies to that Tobin's Q is
not completely meaningless indicator of company performance; a more
general conclusion is that the selected performance measures charac-
terize different aspects of company operations.
6.2. Ownership variables
There is no well-established tradition of selecting specific ownership
measures for the analysis of ownership-performance relationship. In
each particular case the choice of these measures depends on availabil-
ity of information and their appropriateness for specific research ques-
tions. For example, papers focusing on the impact of ownership concen-
tration tend to employ the Herfindahl index or the equity stake of several
largest investors (typically the top five shareholders). Sometimes these
measures undergo a logistic transformation in order to convert bounded
ownership variables into unbounded ones, what was implemented by
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Other authors, especially those who investi-
gate transition economies with low availability of data, use equity stake of
the largest shareholder (Kapelyushnikov, 2000). When analyzing the role
of different groups of owners it is common to distinguish state owner-
ship, ownership by insiders, and ownership by outside owners. The latter
two categories are often disaggregated into managerial ownership and
worker ownership, and ownership by financial outsiders and non-financial
ones correspondingly. Sometimes outside ownership is divided into own-
ership by domestic shareholders and ownership by foreign investors.
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Due to the absence of detailed ownership data in the Skate dataset two
simple indicators of ownership concentration are calculated. The first
one, the variable sum3, measures ownership concentration as percent-
age of voting shares in the hands of the top three shareholders without
drawing distinction between different groups of owners. Since various
state-controlled holdings and the state itself are large shareholders in
many of the sampled firms, and their objective functions and behavior
can be different from those of private investors, the second indicator, the
variable top3, is defined as percentage of voting shares in the hands of
the top three private investors. It reflects concentration of ownership in
the hands of shareholders, which are not related to the state.
Among different groups of owners we identify state ownership, owner-
ship by state-controlled holdings, ownership by insiders and by outside
investors. The latter category is divided into two sub-categories: owner-
ship by foreign investors, and ownership by domestic physical and legal
persons. The quality of data does not allow distinguishing between
managerial and worker ownership in the majority of the sampled firms.
Yet we can make a plausible conjecture regarding the distribution of in-
sider ownership between workers and managers by looking at size of the
sampled companies. In Russia it is a well-documented phenomenon that
the smaller the enterprise the larger the equity stake of managers (Afa-
nasiev et al., 1997). Thus, for the sampled companies with average em-
ployment over 22 thousand people in 1994, it is unlikely that managers
are among their largest shareholders. When insider ownership is sub-
stantial it is likely to be represented by worker ownership rather than
managerial one. This can also lead us to another conjecture that owner-
ship concentration primarily refers to outside owners since worker own-
ership is dispersed by definition and substantial managerial ownership
must be an exception rather than a rule for these companies.
Descriptive statistics for ownership variables are shown in Appendix 5. In
1995 – 1997 the main tendency in the evolution of ownership structures
was a steady decrease of insider share and a rapid increase of outside,
especially foreign, ownership. The most stable among all ownership vari-
ables is ownership by state holdings.
6.3. Model specification
The nature of the data we have allows several research strategies. First,
the data can be disaggregated and analyzed separately for each year. In
this case there is an opportunity to reveal the impact of rapid institutional
changes, which were characteristic of Russia in the 1990s, e.g., the
adoption of the new law on joint-stock companies. An advantage of this
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strategy is the possibility to avoid biases due to inappropriate handling of
high inflation in the 1990s. However, the size of the sample that is used
in this research (101 firm) is hardly enough to conduct the year-by-year
estimation. Since a number of control variables should be included in
addition to the explanatory ones, the number of observations for each
regressor does not exceed 10 and it can easily be predicted that regres-
sion coefficients will be insignificant. Given the nature of the sample that
embraces enterprises from a small group of Russian "blue chips" com-
panies there is no opportunity to increase the number of observations.
Therefore, in what follows the data are analyzed simultaneously as panel
101 × 3. The panel is balanced; the number of observations in each re-
gression is 303.
To reveal the impact of various ownership structures on firm perform-
ance we estimate equations of the following general form:
PERFit = αi + Σj βjH(j)it + Σk γkZ(k)it + εit,
where PERF is one of the selected performance measures, H(j) is the
component number j of the vector of variables representing ownership
characteristics of firm (e.g., variable representing ownership concentra-
tion), Z(k) is the component number k of the vector of control variables,
αi refers to time-invariant firm-specific effects and εit is a random distur-
bance.
Control variables are included in order to prevent the situation when a
significant correlation between performance indicator and ownership
variable is a spurious result of a correlation between these two variables
and a third omitted one. For obvious reasons it is worth to control for
different industries. In all the regressions we include dummies for five in-
dustries: metallurgy, machine building, oil and gas, power utilities, and
telecommunications.
Firm size is another important parameter in our analysis as it can be
correlated with both ownership and performance. For example, firm size
can be related to ownership concentration since larger companies usu-
ally started with more dispersed ownership due to the specifics of the
Russian privatization program (extensive employee ownership). The im-
pact of size on firm performance may even be non-monotonic. On the
one hand, larger firms have more resources and having access to more
resources could lead to higher performance. Besides, larger firms may
effectively lobby their interests in the government (to receive tax indul-
gences or a state order to manufacture certain products, etc.). This is
especially true of the sampled companies, some of which have over
hundred thousand employees. Thus, there may be a positive correlation
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between the size and performance of firms. On the other hand, the ad-
justment of larger companies is typically more complicated and time-
consuming process (e.g., political and social reasons may prevent large
firms from rapid employment restructuring); as a consequence they may
perform worse than smaller companies. Therefore, to control for firm
size we use the variable size, which equals the logarithm of employment
in 1994, and its squared value. The complete list of variables is shown in
Appendix 15.
Whenever possible, we use multiplicative models in which the dependent
variable is the logarithm of some performance indicator. Linear specifi-
cations are applied for profitability whose negative values make compu-
tation of logarithms non-feasible.
6.4. Estimation techniques
There are three basic estimation techniques for panel data. First, a panel
can be analyzed as simple cross-section in case the variation of individ-
ual firm effects (time-invariant characteristics of firms) does not differ
significantly from zero. This assumption can be checked up with the help
of Breush and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. In case the test shows
that the variation of individual effects is different from zero, there is a
choice between fixed and random effects approaches. The distinction
between them is in the interpretation of individual effects and in the un-
derlying assumptions concerning error terms.
Fixed effects model is reasonable if we are confident that the differences
between units can be considered as parametric shifts of the regression
function. It is argued that fixed effects model may be regarded as ap-
plying only to the cross-sectional units in the study, not to additional
ones outside the sample. Sometimes it is more appropriate to treat indi-
vidual specific constant terms as randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units (if sampled cross-sectional units were taken from a large
population). In this case the random effects model seems to be a more
reasonable approach (Greene, 1997). Greene (1997, p. 632) also points
out that "the distinction between fixed and random effects models is an
erroneous interpretation". There is no clear answer what model should
be used in a particular case. One view is that individual effects should
always be interpreted as random (Mundlak, 1978). However, to use ran-
dom effects model one must be confident that its underlying assump-
tions are met. Hausman test provides means to test for orthogonality of
the random effects and regressors, a necessary condition for using this
approach.
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There are also a priori reasons to believe that given the nature of the
data random effect estimation is more suitable. The main argument is
that for a short panel and explanatory variables with low variation (as it is
the case with ownership variables) using fixed-effect approach will lead
to the situation when only a handful of firms will drive the results for re-
gressors. Besides improper estimation of the coefficients, the endoge-
neity problem may be more severe in this case. Thus, following Mundlak
and the above-mentioned considerations, the panel is estimated using
random-effects approach.
6.5. Endogeneity problem
Analysis of the impact of ownership on firm performance often relies on
the implicit assumption that ownership structure is exogenous, i.e., not
affected by performance itself. This assumption, however, can be ques-
tioned in many ways. As mentioned in the theoretical overview, the most
evident case is managerial ownership, which is often affected by firm
performance (managers receive compensation in the form of equity). For
ownership structures that emerge during transition period, endogeneity
problem may be especially severe. Different interest groups might try to
select better firms for their investments and this selection may be ex-
pected on the part of both outside investors and insiders.
Treatment of the endogeneity problem is now considered an important
part of analyses of ownership-performance relationship. In the 1980s it
was common to leave the issue out of careful consideration just men-
tioning possibility of reversed causality between the "dependent" and
"independent" variables (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConnel and
Servaes, 1990). Since that time, a number of authors have taken the is-
sue into account when analyzing the role of ownership (Earle, 1998;
Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Brown and Earle, 2000). In some cases,
this has led to substantial changes in study results.
As applied to our dataset, there are reasons to consider a part of the
ownership variables as exogenous and the other part as being subject to
endogeneity. The first group embraces state ownership and ownership
by state holdings. We believe that after conclusion of mass privatization
the values of these variables were determined by political rather than by
economic factors (i.e., they were hardly influenced by company perform-
ance). In particular, the decision to transfer state blocks of shares to
holding companies looks as politically motivated. Also, one can wonder if
the decision to "freeze" large blocks of shares of some companies
(whose shares were rather liquid and might be relatively easy sold in the
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stock market) in state ownership had an economic rationale rather than
a political one.7
A picture is less clear concerning the other ownership variables. On the
one hand, all the above-mentioned arguments about endogeneity hold.
On the other hand, owing to holding privatization ownership concentra-
tion can be seen as to a large extent "imposed" on the firms rather than
determined by the market. Also, the effect of selection of better enter-
prises on the part of investors may be relatively small — all the sampled
enterprises form a relatively homogenous group of "blue chips" of the
stock market. Besides, the dataset is constructed in such a way that ad-
ditionally reduces the scope of the problem. All the ownership variables
contain records referring to the beginning of each year and thus may be
correlated with firm performance in the previous, but not in the current
year. In other words, with respect to performance indicators the owner-
ship variables contain lagged values.
Taking these considerations into account the subsequent analysis is
conducted in several steps. First, we present results which are obtained
under assumption of exogenous nature of explanatory variables, i.e.,
when the possibility of reversed causality is overlooked. For that purpose
we use random-effects OLS estimation. Second, the instrumental vari-
able (IV) technique is used to control for possible endogeneity of owner-
ship variables. At this stage we use error component two stage least
squares (EC2SLS) estimator developed by Baltagi (see Baltagi, 1995).
The essence of the instrumental variable technique is to construct fitted
values of bad explanatory variables using auxiliary regressions and then
to substitute obtained values into the initial regression. To obtain fitted
values of ownership variables we use a number of instruments which in-
clude both time-invariant variables and those that vary over time. The in-
strumental variables can be classified in three groups. The first group
contains instruments that characterize the process of privatization of the
firms. Instruments from the second group characterize economic and
social conditions of the regions in which the sampled enterprises are lo-
cated. The third group includes variables indicating situation in sectors
the companies belong to.
                                               
7 With respect to state ownership there is still some uncertainty whether it is en-
dogenous or exogenous. Some smaller blocks of shares remained at state dis-
posal only because they had not been sold through voucher or money auctions.
In fact, in most cases state ownership is represented by such stakes, and only
in a few companies large blocks of shares seem to be "frozen" due to political
reasons.
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In the first group we place a dummy for option 2 privatization, a dummy
for "loan-for-shares" privatization, a dummy for holding privatization, and
a variable that reflects time elapsed after privatization (in months). The
second group contains variables reflecting the relative position of regions
with respect to such factors as development of market economy institu-
tions, investments, overdue receivables of regional enterprises, percent-
age of loss-making firms, development of small business, and crime
rates. The third group embraces two variables indicating relative posi-
tions of industries with respect to overdue receivables and output de-
cline. More detailed description of instrumental variables is presented in
Appendix 6.
7. STUDY RESULTS
7.1. Ownership variables are treated
as exogenous: OLS estimation
Two specifications are used to investigate the effect of ownership con-
centration on firm performance. In the first specification, there is no dis-
tinction between different types of owners; concentration is measured in
a rather mechanical way using variable sum3 (the stake of the top three
shareholders). The results (see Appendix 7) indicate that the relationship
between ownership concentration on the one hand and profitability and
Tobin's Q on the other hand follows a U-shaped pattern. The turning
point is about 57.7% for profitability and 80.2% for Tobin's Q. The
quadratic term on ownership concentration for the equation with Tobin's
Q, however, is only marginally significant at 10% level. Since there are
only 25 observations (out of 303) for which ownership concentration ex-
ceeds the turning point of 80.2%, the result should be interpreted as a
negative relationship between Tobin's Q and concentration which has
some curvature rather than as a true U-shaped pattern. On the contrary,
the relationship between concentration and profitability seems to follow a
U-shaped pattern since there are 170 observations with ownership con-
centration equal or greater than 57.7%. The analysis does not reveal any
association between labor productivity and ownership concentration.
Ownership concentration and its squared value are jointly insignificant in
the corresponding regression.
In the second specification, concentration is measured among private
(unrelated to the state) shareholders. The variables state and sthld,
which represent the stake of the state and state-controlled holdings, are
included in regressions as control variables. Regression results are
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shown in Appendix 8. They suggest that ownership concentration in the
hands of private shareholders has no impact on either labor productivity
or profitability. However, ownership concentration has a negative effect
on Tobin's Q. This result is significant at 5% level.
To investigate the role of various ownership types in corporate govern-
ance, performance is regressed on variables reflecting the stakes of
different groups of shareholders, namely insiders, Russian private out-
side investors, foreign investors, and state-controlled holdings. State
ownership is used as base category. The results are reported in Appen-
dix 9. They suggest that there is no link between labor productivity and
Tobin's Q on the one hand and shareholdings of different groups of
owners on the other. Coefficient on insiders is positive and significant at
one per cent level in the equation with profitability, suggesting that
greater insider ownership leads to higher profitability. Coefficient on for-
eign investors is also positive, but significant only at 10% level in the
equation with profitability.
7.2. Ownership variables are treated
as endogenous: IV estimation
Since there is no certainty about exogenous nature of some ownership
variables, all the above-considered models are also estimated using
instrumental variables technique. The results are presented in Appen-
dixes 10 – 12.
As regards ownership concentration among all categories of owners, the
IV estimation reveals a positive linear impact of it on labor productivity,
the result is significant at 5% level (see Appendix 10). In particular, one
per cent increase (in nominal terms) in concentration of ownership
among all categories of owners increases labor productivity by 0.99%. Its
impact on profitability and Tobin's Q generally remains the same as in
the OLS estimation and follows a U-shaped pattern. The turning point is
56% for profitability and 62% for Tobin's Q. The quadratic term in the
equation with Tobin's Q, however, is only marginally significant.
For concentration of ownership in the hands of private owners we find
that it is associated with higher labor productivity but lower Tobin's Q
(see Appendix 11). These relationships are linear. In particular, labor
productivity grows by 0.86% with increase of ownership concentration by
one per cent in nominal terms. There is no evidence that profitability is
affected by concentration of ownership in the hands of private share-
holders.
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Analysis of the role of various groups of owners yields only one statisti-
cally significant result: ownership by Russian legal and physical persons
negatively affects Tobin's Q (see Appendix 12). This stands in sharp
contrast to the results obtained earlier with the help of the OLS estima-
tion when a positive impact on profitability of both insider ownership and
foreign ownership was detected. An important point to be made here is
that the results seem to confirm the presence of reversed causality in
the relationship between ownership and performance.
7.3. The role of majority ownership by the state
This section investigates to what extent our results for ownership con-
centration, especially in the hands of private owners, are influenced by
large incidence of state ownership, in particular, ownership by state
holdings, which is often represented by controlling blocks of shares. The
interests and the behavior of these shareholders are likely to be different
from those of private legal and physical persons. When a state holding is
the main shareholder in a company the concentration of ownership in the
hands of private shareholders may be of minor importance since these
owners can have only limited influence on the decision-making process
within the firm.
To investigate this issue we construct additional variable top3wsc, which
receives the value of the variable top3 if the state and the state holdings
together do not possess a controlling block of shares in a company, and
zero otherwise. We include this new variable top3wsc in a new regres-
sion together with the variables top3, sthld, and state and use random-
effects OLS estimation. Regression results are reported in Appendix 13.
The new variable becomes significant in the regressions with profitability
and Tobin's Q, while the variable top3 becomes significant in the regres-
sion with labor productivity. The regressions show that the effect of con-
centration of ownership in the hands of private owners on company per-
formance is not continuous. The signs on the coefficients indicate a
harmful effect of ownership concentration in the hands of private owners
on profitability and Tobin's Q when the state and state holdings together
do not have a controlling block of shares. Also, the concentration turns
out to have some positive effect on labor productivity. However, the co-
efficients are only marginally significant at 10% level in the equations
with labor productivity and Tobin's Q. Next section contains more exten-
sive discussion of these and the earlier findings, which are summarized
in Appendix 14.
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8. DISCUSSION
The preceding analysis shows that the relationship between ownership
and performance is rather complex and can hardly be confined to simple
models like the one developed by Berle and Means.
Higher concentration of ownership — measured either for all categories
of owners or for the unrelated to the state shareholders only — is con-
nected with higher labor productivity. This finding is expected as it is in
line with the theoretical arguments that more concentrated ownership
results in better monitoring of managers and restrains their opportunities
to pursue their own interests such as living an easy life. However, the
relationships between ownership concentration on the one hand and
profitability and Tobin's Q on the other exhibit quite different patterns
which deserve special attention.
For profitability and concentration of ownership in the hands of all types
of shareholders we find a U-shaped pattern reaching minimum at about
56% level of concentration. This finding together with the earlier result
for labor productivity testify to that efficiency gains (higher labor produc-
tivity) stemming from ownership concentration do not adequately materi-
alize in higher profits. This may indicate the existence of conflicts be-
tween large and small shareholders regarding the distribution of
company profits. Large shareholders may be powerful enough to appro-
priate the lion's share of profit themselves and to deprive small owners
of their part of residual income. The more shares they have the more
likely they will succeed. However, the incentives of large shareholders to
expropriate minority owners are likely to be a decreasing function of
ownership concentration: when ownership concentration approaches
100% the large owners have the legal right on almost all profit. Not sur-
prisingly, minority shareholders oppression peaks when ownership con-
centration is slightly above 50%, which provides the large owners with
control over the company.
A further clue to understanding the relationship between profitability and
ownership concentration can be obtained by differentiating between pri-
vate shareholders and those which are related to the state. We find no
link between concentration of ownership in the hands of private owners
and company profitability. However, when we consider the case of ma-
jority ownership by the state, the regression analysis shows that the con-
centration of private ownership is negatively related to profitability if the
state-related entities do not have a controlling block of shares. The im-
plication seems to be that private shareholders are inclined to extract
private benefits of control and to expropriate minority owners but major-
ity ownership by the state prevents such behavior. This is consistent with
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evidence presented by Black et al. (1999) showing that soon after the
completion of privatization of profitable oil extraction enterprises many of
them suddenly turned into loss-making firms. Thus, we find some evi-
dence that in the pre-crisis Russia majority ownership by the state
played a positive role in corporate governance limiting the scope of
shareholder expropriation.
Our results for Tobin's Q are close to what we find in the analysis of the
concentration-profitability relationship. Concentration of ownership in the
hands of all groups of shareholders decreases the value of companies
and this relationship has some upward curvature. As in the profitability
regression, this result may be interpreted as evidence of high risk of
small shareholder expropriation. The fact that there is no clear U-shaped
relationship similar to the one observed for profitability may stem from
the costs of lower liquidity of shares under more concentrated owner-
ship. When liquidity falls, shares are traded with a discount resulting
in lower values of Tobin's Q. We also find a negative relationship be-
tween concentration of ownership in the hands of private owners and
Tobin's Q. However, when the state has the majority of votes in a com-
pany, the negative effect of ownership concentration vanishes. This is in
line with the earlier conclusion for profitability that substantial state own-
ership prevents large owners from extracting private benefits of control.
Analysis of different ownership types shows that larger ownership by
Russian shareholders which are not related to the state leads to lower
Tobin's Q. This may be interpreted as evidence of inclination of this
group of shareholders to the extraction of private benefits of control
which is reflected in lower prices of company stock. In the OLS estima-
tion we have also found that ownership by both insiders and foreigners is
connected with higher profitability, but this result does not survive in the
IV estimation. Therefore, it should not be interpreted in the sense that
larger ownership by these groups of shareholders improves company
performance.
An interesting by-product of this study is evidence of a significant impact
of size and industry affiliation of companies on their performance. This is
consistent with the findings of Buck et al. (1999) who suggest that non-
governance variables like the extent of crisis at the industry-level may
affect the choice of enterprise strategy much stronger than ownership
variables. The relationship between the size of companies and their per-
formance is somewhat puzzling as it exhibits a U-shaped pattern with the
turning point at employment of about 20 thousand people. This indicates
that firms of relatively small size (i.e., with several thousand employees)
and gigantic companies are better performers than their "medium-sized"
counterparts. We believe that better performance of large firms may be
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attributed to their both economic and political power. In particular, these
firms can effectively influence the government, asking for tax privileges,
state order, changes in price regulations, customs fees, and other forms
of support. This is in line with McKinsey Global Institute report (1999) in-
dicating that unequal treatment of firms by the state in taxation, energy
prices, etc. may be of greater importance than the issues of corporate
governance. The fact that smaller firms perform better may stem from
their greater flexibility as well as inability to engage in rent seeking what
makes efficiency improvement the only source of success. In this way of
reasoning, the "medium-sized" firms perform poorly as they do not have
enough opportunities to lobby their interests and lack necessary flexibil-
ity to raise efficiency shortly after privatization.
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APPENDICES
A1. Descriptive statistics for financial and employment data*
1995 1996 1997
Labor Mean 22431.1 21200.7 20352.5
St. dev. 27329.9 25861.2 24887.0
Min 680.0 728.0 723.0
Max 160000.0 152000.0 134148.0
Median 14300.0 13364.0 12913.0
Capitalization Mean 566.5 1481.9 3478.9
St. dev. 1533.6 4708.2 10733.2
Min 15.8 7.2 45.4
Max 14209.1 42683.9 92370.0
Median 168.0 333.0 873.4
Sales Mean 3240.3 4327.0 4682.2
St. dev. 4465.7 6482.4 7494.9
Min 69.5 119.3 149.6
Max 23421.0 44015.0 53639.0
Median 1682.9 2037.2 2013.0
Gross profit Mean 598.5 403.5 377.4
St. dev. 1023.0 961.5 893.7
Min –445.8 –1163.5 –881.9
Max 5645.0 6228.9 4697.2
Median 235.9 178.3 155.0
Net profit Mean 420.9 291.7 251.4
St. dev. 782.2 773.1 668.5
Min –476.3 –1163.5 –937.4
Max 4040.0 4991.4 3855.6
Median 165.6 126.7 107.4
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1995 1996 1997
Assets Mean 9631.5 10457.8 11080.7
St. dev. 14493.0 15992.9 17245.6
Min 115.5 171.7 212.1
Max 97412.0 102580.0 99487.0
Median 5168.9 5404.5 5814.5
Equity Mean 7830.3 7779.8 7543.8
St. dev. 11585.3 11739.3 11800.6
Min 84.1 90.0 59.8
Max 86053.0 80746.0 73802.0
Median 4330.2 3894.5 3795.2
Long-term debt Mean 140.8 200.3 540.5
St. dev. 481.8 598.0 1624.8
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max 3976.0 4016.8 9799.0
Median 2.1 8.9 13.9
Short-term debt Mean 1660.4 2477.9 2996.6
St. dev. 3503.4 4335.9 5126.2
Min 19.9 23.1 22.7
Max 27338.2 31731.6 34397.0
Median 447.6 886.8 1255.7
* Financial data are reported in millions of denominated rubles (unadjusted for inflation).
A2. Adjustments in financial data
At the stage of data collection several procedures were employed to
minimize the effect of inflation and inconsistent reporting standards in
Russia.
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Firstly, there is undesirable effect of mandatory revaluations of fixed as-
sets which all Russian firms had to follow between 1992 and 1996. It is
important to have fixed assets measured with the lowest possible distor-
tions since the value of assets at the end of each year is used for calcu-
lation of profitability and proxy for Tobin's Q.
Between 1995 and 1997, there was one mandatory revaluation that in-
creased the value of fixed assets 2.63 times on average (Voprosy Statis-
tiki, No 9, 1996, p. 72). It was implemented at the end of 1995. Since
the suppression of inflation in 1996, revaluations were no more manda-
tory and did not affect the value of fixed assets significantly. To exclude
the effect of the 1995 revaluation, book value of assets at the end
of 1995 is substituted with book value of assets on January 1, 1996.
Differences in these values are primarily attributed to revaluation of fixed
assets.
Secondly, the Russian accounting standards allow inclusion of losses
into company balance sheets. These losses can constitute a large share
of company assets; therefore they were subtracted from both the book
value of assets and the book value of equity.
Thirdly, in order to adjust financial data to inflation we have experimented
with several methods. The investigated alternatives are: to use consumer
price index or producer price index as deflator, to recalculate ruble val-
ues into U.S. dollars and to employ an "implicit deflator", which is con-
structed from the Goskomstat nominal industrial output series and the
Goskomstat real industrial output index. Given that the sample embraces
large companies, which make a large contribution to the country's GDP,
these alternatives are judged depending on how well the dynamics of
aggregate sales of the firms corresponds to the dynamics of Russia's
GDP and industrial production. On the basis of this criterion the last-
mentioned method is chosen.
Table A2. Coefficients-"inflators" used to recalculate financial data into December
1997 prices.
1995 1996 1997
Sales and profit 1.576 1.118 1.028
Assets (year-end values) 1.196 1.058 1.000
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A3. Descriptive statistics for performance indicators
1995 1996 1997
Labor productivity* Mean 0.2272 0.2119 0.2209
St. dev. 0.1677 0.1482 0.1491
Min 0.0149 0.0145 0.0261
Max 0.9099 0.8100 0.8589
Median 0.1993 0.1831 0.1881
Profitability* Mean 0.1436 0.0870 0.0710
St. dev. 0.1636 0.1511 0.1334
Min –0.0779 –0.2478 –0.2608
Max 0.9676 0.8635 0.7060
Median 0.1042 0.0582 0.0668
Proxy for Q** Mean 0.0856 0.2314 0.5025
St. dev. 0.1274 0.4105 0.5810
Min 0.0026 0.0062 0.0289
Max 0.8348 2.4947 3.6769
Median 0.0446 0.0889 0.2459
* Financial data of companies are adjusted for inflation.
** Calculated using unadjusted values of market value of equity and book value of equity.
A4. Correlation coefficients between different
performance indicators
Labor productivity Profitability Proxy for Q
1995
Labor productivity 1.0
Profitability 0.2987 1.0
Proxy for Q 0.0787 0.7132 1.0
1996
Labor productivity 1.0
Profitability 0.2278 1.0
Proxy for Q 0.0661 0.6463 1.0
1997
Labor productivity 1.0
Profitability 0.3443 1.0
Proxy for Q 0.2212 0.6946 1.0
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A5. Descriptive statistics for ownership variables*
1995 1996 1997
Mean 12.8 6.9 6.6
St. dev. 18.6 12.6 13.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max 80.0 50.6 65.0
State
Median 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean 22.6 20.3 20.7
St. dev. 26.6 26.4 26.4
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max 80.0 80.0 80.0
State-controlled holdings
Median 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean 27.7 20.5 14.1
St. dev. 16.1 13.6 12.1
Min 4.0 2.0 1.0
Max 71.0 60.0 52.0
Insiders
Median 22.0 17.0 10.0
Mean 31.3 40.4 38.3
St. dev. 17.5 24.8 25.9
Min 1.0 1.0 2.0
Max 84.0 98.0 99.0
Russian shareholders
Median 29.3 33.4 31.0
Mean 5.5 11.9 20.3
St. dev. 9.2 13.6 16.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max 53.0 72.0 75.0
Foreign shareholders
Median 0.0 9.0 17.0
Mean 53.3 56.7 60.9
St. dev. 18.2 17.4 16.8
Min 11.3 15.0 22.0
Max 87.9 92.0 92.0
Top three shareholders
(including the state
and state holdings)
Median 58.0 60.3 64.9
Mean 20.1 31.5 36.1
St. dev. 15.1 22.3 23.1
Min 2.0 2.0 3.0
Max 76.0 92.0 92.0
Top three shareholders
(state-unrelated)
Median 15.0 27.0 33.5
* All figures are reported in percentages.
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A6. Definition of instrumental variables
Instrumental variables reflecting privatization characteristics:
var2 — dummy for privatization under option 2. Equals one if a firm was
privatized under option 2 (majority employee ownership), and zero oth-
erwise. This is a time-invariant variable, which apparently influences
performance only via ownership structure. It can be argued that per-
formance of enterprises hardly had any strong influence on the probabil-
ity that they would choose option 2. During mass privatization insiders in
most cases were eager to invest in enterprises they were working for
since they could obtain shares on preferential terms (compared to other
citizens), hence they preferred option 2 privatization. Option 1 was typi-
cally chosen by large and capital-intensive firms, whose employees did
not have enough funds to buy out 51 per cent of equity. The variable is
time-invariant.
lfsh — dummy for privatization through loan-for-shares scheme (totally
six enterprises). Equals one if an enterprise has gone through loan-for-
shares privatization by the time the ownership data are recorded, and
zero otherwise. Politically determined method of privatization, hence, it
was hardly influenced by firm performance.
holdpriv — dummy for holding privatization; equals one if a block of
shares of a company was transferred to some holding. This method of
privatization was predetermined by political rather than by economic
considerations. The variable is time-invariant.
tpriv — time passed since corporatization of enterprises, in months. This
variable is assumed to capture differences in time the enterprises were
privatized at (ownership structure may undergo larger changes at firms
that were privatized earlier) as well as trends in the evolution of owner-
ship structure, in particular, redistribution of equity from insiders to out-
siders and growing ownership concentration.
Variables reflecting regional differences:
These variables, except for the first two, vary over 1995 – 1997 and
contain lagged values with respect to ownership data. Thus, their values
for 1994, e.g., are used to instrument for ownership in 1995.
inst — institutional rating of regions according to Expert journal. The rat-
ing is said to reflect "degree to which major institutions of market econ-
omy are developed in regions" (Expert, No 47, 1996, p. 31). Lower val-
ues of the variable mean higher institutional rating. Included due to the
assumption that changes in ownership structure proceed faster in re-
gions with higher institutional rating. Time-invariant, year 1996 values.
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risk — regional investment risk according to Expert journal. Lower values
mean lower investment risk. The variable is time-invariant and contains
1996 values.
reg_inv — indicates relative position of regions with respect to invest-
ments in fixed assets. The variable is defined as:
Russia of GDP
product  regional  gross
Russia in assets fixed in investment
region the in assets fixed in investment
=reg_inv .
Included owing to the assumption that it can reflect "attractiveness" of
regions with respect to investments. Changes in ownership structure are
likely to proceed faster in regions with higher values of this variable.8
reg_rec — relative position of regions with respect to overdue receivables
of firms (arrears). The variable is defined as:
Russia of GDP
product regional gross
Russia in sreceivable overdue
region the in firms of sreceivable overdue
   reg_rec = .
The reason to include this variable is that regions that are subject to a
greater incidence of arrears may be particularly unattractive to some
groups of investors.
reg_loss — relative position of regions with respect to the share of loss-
making enterprises. The variable is defined as:
Russia in firms making-loss of percentage
region the in firms making-loss of percentage
   reg_loss = .
The variable is intended to indicate general economic conditions in re-
gions.
reg_smbs — relative position of regions with respect to the development
of small business. The variable is defined the following way:
 Russia in capita per firms small of number
region the in capita per firms small of number
  reg_smbs = .
                                               
8 Here and later on we use relative values of regional and industrial instrumental
variables in order to prevent spurious time-series correlation between them and
ownership variables. For example, ownership concentration and regional invest-
ments may show similar trends and, hence, substantial correlation while being
loosely related in reality.
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The variable is intended to indicate general economic conditions in re-
gions. Also, it can characterize attitudes of regional authorities with re-
spect to business, e.g., the degree of bureaucratization and corruption.
reg_crime — relative position of regions with respect to criminalization.
The variable is defined as the number of murders and attempted mur-
ders per capita in the region divided by the same indicator for Russia.
 Russia in capita per
 murders attempted and murders of number
region the in capita per
 murders attempted and murders of number
   reg_crime = .
Variables characterizing industrial differences:
These variables vary over 1995 – 1997 and contain lagged values with
respect to ownership data.
ind_rec — relative position of industries with respect to overdue receiv-
ables. The variable is calculated as:
Russia of GDP
industry the in produced added value
Russia in sreceivable overdue
industry the in sreceivable overdue
= ind_rec .
If an industry is characterized by a high spread of overdue receivables,
the cash flows within that industry are likely to be thin, hence it may be
of small interest to investors. The variable can be especially powerful in
explaining the dynamics of ownership concentration, since one of the
main benefits for concentrated owners is extraction of private benefits of
control, which are tied to cash flows of firms.
ind_ch — change in output in a particular industry one year before own-
ership data are recorded. Included due to the assumption that some
type of investors may be reluctant to invest in industries experiencing
decline.
Besides the mentioned instrumental variables, first-stage regressions in-
clude all control variables that are used in the second stage. Among
them are five industrial dummies, year dummies, two measures of size,
and variables reflecting ownership stakes of the state and state holdings.
Exogeneity of the latter has already been discussed.
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A7. Concentration of ownership
and firm performance. OLS estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
sum3 –0.0072912 –0.80 –0.0081068** –2.40 –0.0364799** –2.25
sum3_squared 0.000083 1.02 0.0000703** 2.47 0.0002274* 1.68
metl 0.2239741 1.48 –0.0413811 –0.92 –0.8033664*** –2.68
mach –0.9063632*** –4.49 –0.0883254* –1.89 –1.433813*** –3.94
oilg 0.535353*** 3.11 –0.0451448 –0.98 –0.2277241 –0.70
enrg 0.771668*** 4.84 –0.0290223 –0.61 –0.5686859* –1.76
telc –0.5195799*** –2.93 0.0482318 0.89 0.9236569*** 2.93
size –2.314757*** –3.51 –0.2815132 –1.55 –2.128578* –1.94
size_squared 0.1193738*** 3.39 0.0138157 1.51 0.1080253* 1.88
y96 –0.0150123 –0.45 0.0790061 1.17 –0.7952727*** –5.58
y97 0.0010466 0.03 0.0776594 1.19 –0.7281168*** –5.07
inflation 0.0011168* 1.88
log(rtsindex) 1.634848*** 14.13
_cons 9.38308*** 3.08 1.619398* 1.80 1.76121 0.34
Wald chi2 151.22 78.98 532.07
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Test for RE:
chi2 (1) 194.73 132.47 95.00
Test for RE:
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
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A8. Concentration of private ownership
and firm performance. OLS estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
top3 0.0056634 1.11 –0.0017106 –0.90 –0.0129806** –2.43
top3_squared –0.0000423 –0.76 0.0000146 0.70
state 0.0003436 0.15 –0.0012931 –1.50 –0.0086353 –1.34
sthld 0.0021453 0.92 –0.0007528 –0.99 –0.0098183* –1.69
metl 0.1985806 1.28 –0.0514941 –1.11 –0.7758237** –2.43
mach –0.9175645*** –4.49 –0.0903877** –1.99 –1.419947*** –3.68
oilg 0.5181137*** 2.84 –0.0582163 –1.19 –0.270562 –0.79
enrg 0.7767579*** 4.44 –0.0366709 –0.71 –0.6978815* –1.94
telc –0.5360582*** –2.83 0.0472459 0.86 0.8189867** 2.32
size –2.407014*** –3.62 –0.303274* –1.72 –2.207368* –1.92
size_squared 0.1241683*** 3.48 0.0148044* 1.66 0.1109702* 1.85
y96 –0.0370666 –1.01 0.0535684 0.83 –0.7889415*** –5.21
y97 –0.014912 –0.38 0.0555488 0.90 –0.7106476*** –4.64
inflation 0.000949* 1.65
log(rtsindex) 1.656049*** 14.35
_cons 9.567261*** 3.10 1.613615* 1.81 1.55617 0.29
Wald chi2 148.76 71.26 546.32
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Test for RE:
chi2 (1) 196.45 125.76 102.89
Test for RE:
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
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A9. Various groups of owners
and firm performance. OLS estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
insid –0.0026897 –0.81 0.0023809*** 2.96 0.0093533 1.32
russian 0.0015412 1.02 0.0007639 1.55 –0.0031033 –0.60
foreign 0.003791 1.44 0.0017368* 1.69 0.0080996 1.26
sthld 0.0019723 1.21 0.0005251 1.33 –0.0002707 –0.07
metl 0.2323718 1.56 –0.0460213 –0.94 –0.7860337** –2.33
mach –0.8715448*** –4.03 –0.0739267 –1.53 –1.306594*** –3.19
oilg 0.5100365*** 2.74 –0.0283455 –0.59 –0.2748008 –0.77
enrg 0.7699834*** 4.58 –0.0082845 –0.16 –0.7668783** –2.03
telc –0.5507876*** –2.90 0.0775047 1.42 0.7813431** 2.15
size –2.340887*** –3.62 –0.3160892* –1.81 –1.920157** –1.98
size_squared 0.1205002*** 3.47 0.015647* 1.77 0.0971884* 1.92
y96 –0.0878943* –1.91 0.0618132 0.73 –0.7251498*** –4.81
y97 –0.0614389 –1.36 0.0646737 0.78 –0.648285*** –4.15
inflation 0.001003 1.29
log(rtsindex) 1.548253*** 12.22
_cons 9.367876*** 3.17 1.4617* 1.82 –0.2265921 –0.05
Wald chi2 159.84 80.44 546.29
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Test for RE:
chi2 (1) 193.01 123.67 92.32
Test for RE:
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
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A10. Concentration of ownership
and firm performance. IV estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
sum3 0.0098235** 2.14 –0.0207848** –2.55 –0.1516202** –1.97
sum3_squared 0.0001855*** 2.60 0.001224* 1.82
metl 0.1452791 0.74 –0.0373763 –0.76 –0.7173452* –1.67
mach –0.978368*** –4.82 –0.0878735* –1.73 –1.381342*** –3.13
oilg 0.3102374 1.37 –0.0326654 –0.52 0.0267061 0.05
enrg 0.5193694** 2.14 –0.0156326 –0.23 –0.288405 –0.48
telc –0.7863507*** –3.41 0.0651104 0.98 1.242237** 2.10
size –2.116004*** –3.53 –0.250663* –1.66 –2.011259 –1.53
size_squared 0.1084279*** 3.43 0.0127297 1.61 0.1065716 1.55
y96 –0.0573525 –1.51 0.0962745 0.93 –0.7457243*** –4.37
y97 –0.0471946 –1.13 0.089011 0.87 –0.7239872*** –4.31
inflation 0.001221 1.32
log(rtsindex) 1.653209*** 11.59
_cons 8.003193*** 2.83 1.714483** 2.27 3.503849 0.57
Wald chi2 147.37 97.53 511.36
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
Instrumented: sum3, sum3_squared.
Instruments: metl, mach, oilg, enrg, telc, size, size squared, y96, y97, var2, lfsh, tpriv, hold-
priv, inst, risk, reg_inv, reg_rec, reg_loss, reg_smbs, reg_crime, ind_rec, ind_ch.
Note: The variable sum3_squared is dropped when the coefficients on it and the variable
sum3 are both insignificant while their joint significance is not rejected at p = 0.05.
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A11. Concentration of private ownership
and firm performance. IV estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
top3 0.0085571** 1.98 0.0008675 0.25 –0.0245862** –2.22
top3_squared –8.87×10–7 –0.03
sthld 0.0082888* 1.93 0.000347 0.33 –0.0198469* –1.90
state 0.0059313 1.45 –0.0002857 –0.28 –0.0179279* –1.82
metl 0.1417044 0.73 –0.0651324** –1.97 –0.6623159* –1.93
mach –0.9716353*** –4.86 –0.1022345*** –3.06 –1.318757*** –3.77
oilg 0.3373346 1.55 –0.0826957** –2.01 0.0060217 0.01
enrg 0.5649199** 2.36 –0.0545669 –1.11 –0.4241694 –0.91
telc –0.7483578*** –3.28 0.0175141 0.40 1.133473** 2.46
size –2.196841*** –3.72 –0.2837913*** –2.85 –2.517542** –2.43
size_squared 0.1129603*** 3.63 0.0137582*** 2.61 0.1275072** 2.33
y96 –0.0685764* –1.65 0.1115944 0.99 –0.8080776*** –4.92
y97 –0.0562402 –1.25 0.1130422 1.00 –0.7185684*** –4.32
inflation 0.0015441 1.51
log(rtsindex) 1.73398*** 12.61
_cons 8.425751*** 3.03 1.38296*** 2.74 3.035768 0.62
Wald chi2 151.76 119.64 558.23
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
Instrumented: top3, top3_squared.
Instruments: state, sthld, metl, mach, oilg, enrg, telc, size, size squared, y96, y97, var2, lfsh,
tpriv, holdpriv, inst, risk, reg_inv, reg_rec, reg_loss, reg_smbs, reg_crime, ind_rec, ind_ch.
Note: The variable top3_squared is dropped when the coefficients on it and the variable top3
are both insignificant while their joint significance is not rejected at p = 0.05.
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A12. Various groups of owners
and firm performance. IV estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
insid –0.0034006 –0.58 0.000608 0.43 –0.0066512 –0.57
russian –0.0038331 –1.27 –0.0005664 –0.70 –0.0146656* –1.88
foreign 0.0041865 0.82 0.0007519 0.43 0.0184934 1.11
sthld –0.0008659 –0.40 –0.0002224 –0.40 –0.0059116 –1.09
metl 0.3412965* 1.69 –0.0295003 –0.71 –0.4931171 –1.46
mach –0.7423987*** –3.33 –0.064545 –1.28 –0.9058135** –2.13
oilg 0.6461126*** 2.79 –0.0311704 –0.65 –0.0970652 –0.25
enrg 0.8084792*** 3.35 –0.030195 –0.61 –0.7387046* –1.80
telc –0.4891692** –2.05 0.0510506 1.05 0.732749* 1.82
size –2.275998*** –3.81 –0.2872228** –2.46 –1.462361 –1.60
size_squared 0.1168752*** 3.70 0.0138686** 2.25 0.0718119 1.48
y96 –0.0643218 –1.22 0.1211734 0.69 –0.5616515*** –2.75
y97 –0.0336487 –0.65 0.1243701 0.70 –0.4507715* –2.07
inflation 0.0015093 0.90
log(rtsindex) 1.240829*** 4.96
_cons 9.249298*** 3.33 1.400586** 2.25 –0.1658956 –0.04
Wald chi2 145.88 106.48 475.27
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
Instrumented: insid, russian, foreign.
Instruments: sthld, metl, mach, oilg, enrg, telc, size, size squared, y96, y97, var2, lfsh, tpriv,
holdpriv, inst, risk, reg_inv, reg_rec, reg_loss, reg_smbs, reg_crime, ind_rec, ind_ch.
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A13. Concentration of private ownership and firm performance
under majority ownership by the state. OLS estimation
log(lprod) profitab log(q)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
top3 0.0071712* 1.71 0.0013847 1.42 –0.0006496 –0.08
top3wsc –0.005918 –1.33 –0.0020932** –2.02 –0.0139561* –1.92
state –0.0008944 –0.39 –0.0016727* –1.83 –0.0111817* –1.66
sthld 8.52×10–7 0.00 –0.0015097 –1.55 –0.014522** –2.25
metl 0.1997949 1.30 –0.0535646 –1.15 –0.7823477** –2.46
mach –0.9154749*** –4.53 –0.0913983** –2.01 –1.42234*** –3.73
oilg 0.4994127*** 2.82 –0.0534273 –1.16 –0.2847853 –0.84
enrg 0.7880896*** 4.42 –0.0080188 –0.16 –0.6027091* –1.69
telc –0.5695402*** –2.98 0.0453344 0.85 0.7595216** 2.15
size –2.395532*** –3.59 –0.323448* –1.70 –2.261658* –1.93
size_squared 0.123823*** 3.46 0.0159487* 1.66 0.1144162* 1.88
y96 –0.0337427 –0.89 0.0683065 1.04 –0.7845733*** –5.15
y97 –0.0174677 –0.45 0.0694991 1.10 –0.7159598*** –4.65
inflation 0.0011094* 1.89
log(rtsindex) 1.64529*** 14.03
_cons 9.592094*** 3.10 1.674682* 1.79 1.901668 0.34
Wald chi2 150.42 71.71 611.92
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Test for RE:
chi2 (1) 195.15 126.42 100.00
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* — significant at 10%;
** — significant at 5%;
*** — significant at 1%.
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A14. Main results: summary table
Labor productivity Profitability Tobin's Q
OLS estimation
Concentration of
ownership among
all categories of
shareholders
No relationship U-shaped
relationship,
turning point at
57.7%, 5%
significance level
U-shaped
relationship,
turning point at
80.2%, 5%
significance level
(the upper part is
marginally
significant at 10%)
Concentration of
ownership among
private
shareholders
No relationship No relationship Inverse
relationship, 5%
significance level
Different groups of
owners
No relationship Insiders — positive
relationship, 1%
significance level;
Foreigners —
positive
relationship, 10%
significance level
No relationship
IV estimation
Concentration of
ownership among
all categories of
shareholders
Positive
relationship, 5%
significance level
U-shaped
relationship,
turning point at
56.0%, 1 – 5%
significance level
U-shaped
relationship,
turning point at
61.9%, 5%
significance level
(the upper part is
marginally
significant at 10%)
Concentration of
ownership among
private
shareholders
Positive
relationship, 5%
significance level
No relationship Inverse
relationship, 5%
significance level
Different groups of
owners
No relationship No relationship Ownership by
Russian
shareholders
negatively affects
firm value, 10%
significance level
OLS estimation, ownership concentration under majority ownership by the state
Concentration of
ownership among
private
shareholders
Positive when the
state has control,
10% significance
level
Negative when the
state does not
have control, 5%
significance level
Negative when the
state does not
have control, 10%
significance level
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A15. Complete list of variables
Dependent variables:
lprod — labor productivity; sales to employment ratio;
profitab — profitability; gross profit divided by book value of equity;
q — proxy for Tobin's Q; market value of equity divided by book value of
equity.
Independent variables:
state — state ownership on 1 January of the respective year (percentage
of voting shares);
sthld — ownership by state holdings on 1 January of the respective year
(voting shares);
insid — ownership by insiders on 1 January of the respective year (voting
shares);
russian — ownership by domestic investors on 1 January (voting shares);
foreign — ownership by foreign persons on 1 January of the respective
year (voting shares);
sum3 — concentration measure; defined as stake of top three share-
holders regardless of their type on 1 January of the respective year
(voting shares);
top3 — concentration measure; defined as stake of top three state-
unrelated shareholders (excluding the state and state-controlled hold-
ings) on 1 January of the respective year (voting shares);
top3wsc — auxiliary variable, which is used to take into account the dis-
tribution of control within the firm; equals the variable top3 if the state
and state-controlled holdings together do not have a controlling block of
shares, and zero otherwise;
size — logarithm of employment in 1994;
metl — dummy for metallurgy;
mach — dummy for engineering industry;
oilg — dummy for oil, gas, and chemical industry;
enrg — dummy for power utilities;
telc — dummy for telecommunication industry;
inflation — inflation rate in the respective year;
rtsindex — Russian Trading System index at the end of respective year;
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y96 — dummy for 1996;
y97 — dummy for 1997.
Instrumental variables:
var2 — dummy for the second variant of privatization;
lfsh — dummy for privatization through loan-for-shares scheme (totally
six enterprises);
tpriv — time passed since corporatization of an enterprise;
holdpriv — dummy for holding privatization;
inst — institutional rating, 1 means the highest rating;
risk — investment risk, 1 means the lowest risk;
reg_inv — relative position of regions with respect to investments;
reg_rec — relative position of regions with respect to overdue receiv-
ables;
reg_loss — relative position of regions with respect to the share of loss
making firms;
reg_smbs — relative position of regions with respect to the development
of small business;
reg_crime — relative position of regions with respect to criminalization;
ind_rec — relative position of industries with respect to overdue receiv-
ables;
ind_ch — change in output in a particular industry one year before own-
ership data are recorded.
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